At the beginning, the poetry was considered as the genesis of the arabic art, and after then the prose of adab, both of them appeared with the idea of the "beauty science". This idea would be projected on the music. On the other hand, the greek heritage of the classic arabic philosophy legacy was reflected during the first manuscripts of the arabic philosophers and musical theoreticians as al-Kindf and al-Farabf, as a result appeared a new conception of the "beauty" and (...) "aesthetic". By this way, taking as a point of reference the greek classical world, the new parameters would appear as an result of this own reality and idiosyncrasy. Their poetry and musical legacy, joined to the philosopher and religious mind would complete the work of the "aesthetic musical art". The study of the arabic middle music prove that the harmony in the poetry, lingüistic and rhitmycal contents, go in parallel with the melodic content until it reached a harmonic relation and in definitive cosmic, and as a result an "aesthetic ideal". This ideal was based on "beauty" and the "aesthetic emotion" produced by the art and all that as reflet to the harmonic until the corp and the spirit and oriented to the spherical work and to the divinity. (shrink)

The acceptance or rejection of classmates is one of the most widely recognized determinants of wellbeing in childhood. This study analyses psychosocial adjustment and sociometric status in primary education pupils, and possible differences by gender. A cross-sectional survey was undertaken in Huelva. The surveyed schools were selected using a stratified random sampling technique with both public and private elementary schools. Sample was composed of 247 4th grade students. Data revealed gender differences in psychosocial adjustment, particularly in terms of prosocial behavior (...) in girls and behavioral problems in boys. Popular and rejected statuses presented opposing adjustment profiles, particularly in hyperactive symptoms and behavioral problems. When the sample was separated by gender, the differences between the types of status in emotional symptomatology and prosocial behavior disappeared. In addition, the differences between statuses were greater in boys, and were defined mainly by hyperactivity, whilst for girls these differences were more apparent in behavioral problems. (shrink)

This paper argues that the normative character of our unreflective situated behaviour is not factual. We highlight a problematic assumption shared by the two most influential trends in contemporary philosophy of cognitive science, reductionism and enactivism. Our intentional, normative explanations are referential, descriptive or factual. Underneath this assumption lies the idea that only facts can make true or false our attributions of cognitive, mental and agential abilities. We will argue against this view by describing the main features and problems of (...) reductionism and enactivism and then we will offer two arguments against this shared factualist assumption: (1) normative vocabulary is ineliminable if we want a complete explanation of our situated practices; and (2) the factualist assumption is a species of the is-ought fallacy. Finally, we will claim that a folk psychological explanation of our normative practices is fully compatible with ontological naturalism when such descriptivist or factualist assumption is rejected. (shrink)

Mixture modeling technics are not the one and only to perform person-centered analyses, but they do offer the possibility of integrating latent profiles into models of some complexity that include antecedents and results. When analyzing the contribution of socioemotional resources to the preservation of mental health, it is the variable-centered approaches that are the most often performed, with few examples using a person-centered approach. Moreover, if the focus is on the Arab adolescent population, to our knowledge, there is an absence (...) of such studies. This study aims to extend the research about socioemotional resources by examining: if distinguishable profiles can be identified based on scores about perceptions of different emotional abilities and levels of social support from different sources ; if the identified profiles relate to mental health indicators, such as depression levels and health-related quality of life ; and to acknowledge if sociodemographic variables such as age or gender and positive self-views ascertain the probability of pertaining to the identified profiles. The study was carried out on a large sample of Moroccan adolescents. We adopted a person-centered approach using latent profile analysis to establish whether different socioemotional resources profiles are present in Moroccan adolescents. Furthermore, we investigated the role of sociodemographic variables and self-esteem as antecedents of these profiles and the association of these profiles with mental health. Results from LPA revealed three patterns of socioemotional resources : “High socioemotional resources” ; “Moderate socioemotional resources” ; and “Low socioemotional resources”. Analyses showed that Moroccan adolescents differed significantly in depression and HRQoL depending on the profile membership. Profiles with higher levels of resources contributed positively to preserving mental health. Finally, the results show that self-esteem boosted the probability of pertaining to the profiles related to better mental health. Thus, this study extends previous research about socioemotional resources, highlighting that researchers and health professionals should consider empirically identified profiles of adolescents when explaining mental health outcomes. Therefore, the psychological intervention should be focused on enhancing the self-esteem of adolescents, to favor a high socioemotional resource profile, which results in better mental health. (shrink)

Jorge Mpodozis presents natural drift as an organism-centered view of biological evolution. Currently, many other research programs in biology and philosophy of biology pursue organismic perspectives in evolution. We consider some of the features appearing in the article in this light in order to highlight what is special in Mpodozis’s proposal. We contend that collaborations among research programs would be valuable and suggest that the major contribution of natural drift for organismic projects lies in its dynamic organizational features.

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

This paper aims to propose an inferential and dynamic approach to understanding with models in biology. Understanding plays a central role in the practice of modeling. From its links with the other two central elements of scientific research, experimentation, and explanation, we show its epistemic relevance to the case of explanation in biology. Furthermore, by including the notion of understanding, we propose a non-referentialist perspective on scientific models, which is determined by their use.

In this paper, we analyze the origin of the links between global bioethics (which we differentiate from biomedical bioethics) and human rights. We understand that we are in a global civilizational crisis, whose roots extend to 1492 today, in which the modern-capitalist model used the discourse of human rights to justify its predatory technocracy. There are three theoretical assumptions that support our analysis: 1) The current conditions in which the technique shows its destructive power over nature (Anthropocene) indicate that none (...) of the ethical antecedents are applicable to such circumstances. In this new context, the kantian categorical imperative has been reconverted into a moral and political duty to not instrumentalize either human beings or nature. We call this new ethical consideration bioethics. 2) The current geopolitical composition of the world must be thought in terms of the global North and the global South, as two regions that are forged in the midst of important processes of globalization of the world-system, and whose main consequence lies in the absence of equity in the distribution of wealth and well-being between the two. 3) The current environmental crisis or climate change, the product of an economic model based on extractive technology, has become one of the most serious threats against human rights. (shrink)

The paper defends a version of Direct Reference for indexicals on which reference-fixing material (token-reflexive conditions) plays the role of an ancillary presupposition.

There are propositions constituting the content of fictions—sometimes of the utmost importance to understand them—which are not explicitly presented, but must somehow be inferred. This essay deals with what these inferences tell us about the nature of fiction. I will criticize three well-known proposals in the literature: those by David Lewis, Gregory Currie, and Kendall Walton. I advocate a proposal of my own, which I will claim improves on theirs. Most important for my purposes, I will argue on this basis, (...) against Walton’s objections, for an illocutionary-act account of fiction, inspired in part by some of Lewis’s and Currie’s suggestions, but (perhaps paradoxically) above all by Walton’s deservedly influential views. (shrink)

Defends a version of the Davidsonian Demonstrative Theory of quotation against proponents of the Fregean Identity Theory.

I defend a Deferred Ostension view of quotation, on which quotation-marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a demonstrative; the quoted material merely plays the role of a demonstratum. On this view, the quoted material works like Nunberg’s indexes in his account of deferred ostensión in general. The referent is obtained through some contextually suggested relation; in the default case the relation will be … instantiates the linguistic type __, but there are other possibilities. In this way, the (...) deferred ostension view deals with a problem I pointed out for the identity proposal in my earlier work, that we do not merely refer with quotations to expression-types, but also to other entities related in some way to the relevant token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those constituting its linguistic type, features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but not by the one actually used (as when, by using a graphic token, we refer to its phonetic type), or even other related tokens (see the examples on p. 261 of García-Carpintero 1994). (shrink)

On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth-bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well-known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside . . . rightly emphasized by Williamson . . . is the implicit surrender of the T-scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T- scheme, and (...) suggest acceptable approximations. (shrink)

Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...) Tarski’s failure in his allegedly intended physicalistic reduction was total. From another front, Hilary Putnam argued for an even more sweeping thesis: “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Scott Soames followed suit also on this count, endorsing Putnam’s argument in section iii of the aforementioned paper; and John Etchemendy used a very similar argument to contend that “a Tarskian definition of truth [...] cannot possibly illuminate the semantic properties of the object language.” The paper argues that these contentions are based on several misunderstandings about the nature of a definition like Tarski’s. Regarding the Putnam-Soames-Etchemendy argument, we must apply a distinction Frege found natural to draw—and is natural to draw anyway—between what he called “constructive” definitions, definitions properly so called, which are mere stipulations, and what he described as “analytic” definitions, definitions which aim to make explicit the meaning of a term already in use. Regarding the Field-Soames-Stalnaker criticism, the paper contends that the true aims of a Tarskian truth definition are perfectly well fulfilled without Field’s amendments. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Peacocke (2001) continues an ongoing debate with McDowell and others, providing renewed arguments for the view that perceptual experiences and some other mental states have a particular kind of content, nonconceptual content. In this article I want to object to one of the arguments he provides. This is not because I side with McDowell in the ongoing debate about nonconceptual content; on the contrary, given the way I understand it, my views are closer to Peacocke’s, and (...) have been strongly influenced by him. It is just that I am not persuaded by the particular argument I will be questioning here. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...) the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. (shrink)

Manuel García Carpintero defends a form of antirealism for the explicit talk and thought both about fictional entities and scientific models: a version of StephenYablo’s figuralist brand of factionalism. He argues that, in contrast with pretense-theoretic fictionalist proposals, on his view, utterances in those discourses are straightforward assertions with straightforward truth-conditions, involving a particular kind of metaphors or figurative manner. But given that the relevant metaphors are all but “dead”, this might suggest that the view is after all (...) realist, committed to referents of some sort for singular terms in the relevant discourses. He revisits these issues from the perspective of the more recent work on them and applies his view to recent debates in semantics on the role and adequacy of supervaluationist models of indeterminacy. (shrink)

John Searle argues that fictions are constituted by mere pretense—by the simulation of representational activities like assertions, without any further representational aim. They are not the result of sui generis, dedicated speech acts of a specific kind, on a par with assertion. The view had earlier many defenders, and still has some. Stefano Predelli enlists considerations derived from Searle in support of his radical fictionalism. This is the view that a sentence of fictional discourse including a prima facie empty fictional (...) name like “Emma Woodhouse” in fact “is not a sentence, and it encodes no proposition whatsoever.” His argument is broadly abductive; he claims that this view affords compelling explanations of features of fictions he finds well-established, among them that fictions without explicit narrators nonetheless have covert ones. Here I take up his arguments, in defense of the dedicated speech act view. I thus address pressing issues about the status of fictional names and the nature and ubiquity of narrators in fictions. (shrink)

The paper reviews proposals by Abell, Predelli, and others on the semantics of fiction, focusing on the discourse through which fictions are created. Predelli develops the radical fictionalism of former writers like Kripke and van Inwagen, on which that discourse is contentless and does not express propositions. This paper offers reasons to doubt these claims. It then explores realist proposals like Abell’s in which singular terms in fictions refer to fictional characters, understood as socially created representational artifacts, and irrealist alternatives (...) in which the discourse is fully meaningful even though those terms fail to refer. (shrink)

In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain (...) at the same time a “token-reflexive” theory of perception and the thesis of direct realism. (shrink)

Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if (...) Tarski himself was sceptical about modalities. (shrink)

Critica discussion of Pasquale Frascolla, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Introduzione alla lettura, Carocci, Roma, 2000, 322 pp.

In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...) entities such as utterances or assertions , and the de flationary accounts do not provide a similarly deflationary account for those applications. In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that no such account would be forthcoming; we need something more substantive or in flationary there. (shrink)

As the subtitle “A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities” makes clear, Alberto Voltolini intends in this book to argue for a syncretic view of the ontology and the semantics of fiction. In the process, he offers sympathetic and clear presentations of the main contenders in the field, discussing first ontological matters (chapters 1–4) and then semantic questions (chapters 5–6), and concluding with an ‘ontological’ argument for the allegedly syncretic brand of realism about fictional entities he has by then endorsed. The (...) book will therefore be very useful for all those who want to have a guided overview of the state of the art in the field, and very helpful if used as a main text for an introductory graduate course. (shrink)

After a critical examination of several attempts to characterize the Analytic tradition in philosophy, in the book here discussed Hanjo Glock goes on to contend that Analytic Philosophy is “a tradition that is held together both by ties of influence and by a family of partially overlapping features”. Here I question the need to appeal to a “family resemblance” component, arguing instead (in part by drawing on related attempts to characterize art, art genres and art schools) for a genealogical characterization. (...) Nonetheless, I point out that the difference between these two views might end being merely terminological, for, properly understood, a genealogical characterization will have to mention a “family of partially overlapping features” in describing the origins of Analytic Philosophy and the lines of influence among analytic philosophers. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between two conceptions of kinds defined by constitutive rules, the one suggested by Searle, and the one invoked by Williamson to define assertion. Against recent arguments to the contrary by Maitra, Johnson and others, it argues for the superiority of the latter in the first place as an account of games. On this basis, the paper argues that the alleged disanalogies between real games and language games suggested in the literature in fact don’t exist. The paper relies (...) on Rawls’s distinction between types of practices and institutions defined by constitutive rules, and those among them that are actually in force, and hence are truly normative; it defends along Rawlsian lines that a plurality of norms apply to actual instances of rule-constituted practices, and uses this Rawlsian line to block the examples that Maitra, Johnson and others provide to sustain their case. (shrink)

The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...) formulations) then there is indeed a different sort of compositionality; however, the second variety is not an alternative to the language of thought in that case. On the other hand, if the concept of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way, along the lines of Van Gelder's explicit definition, then there is no reason to think that there is an alternative way of explaining systematicity. (shrink)

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Se presentan propuestas recientes en tres ámbitos de la filosofía del lenguaje en que se están haciendo contribuciones significativas: el fenómeno de la vaguedad; la distinción entre semántica y pragmática, y el uso de semánticas “bidimensionales” para tratar problemas generados por las tesis de “referencia directa”. Hace unos años existia una percepción de la pérdida por la filosofia del lenguaje, en favor de la filosofia de la mente, del lugar central ocupado en la tradición analítica -una perdida que equivaldría según (...) Dummett al abandono del rasgo distintivo de esa tradición. Tomando como modelo ilustrativo las propuestas presentadas, se sugieré que tal percepción se ha revelado una moda pasajera y aventura una hipótesis explicativa.Some recent proposals in three fields in the philosophy of language are discussed: vagueness, the semantics-pragmatics distinction, and the use of “bidimensional” semantics to treat problems created by “Direct Reference” theses. Some years ago there was a perception concerning the loss of the philosophy of language, in favour ofthe philosophy of mind, of its central place in the analytic tradition -a loss which, according to Dummett, would amount to the loss of its most distinctive trait. With the discussed proposals as illustrative model, it is suggested that that perception was the product of a fleeting fashion, and an explanatory hypothesis is ventured. (shrink)

Firm managers play an important role in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. Education is emerging as the key factor in developing a sense of moral responsibility amongst the business students who will eventually become company managers and decision makers. The aim of this research is, thus, twofold. First, to analyze the existence of a direct positive correlation between university students’ perception of CSR and its impact on business performance; and second, to examine the extent to which two (...) factors (advantages brought by CSR and responsibilities toward stakeholders) act as mediation variables in the aforementioned correlation. The analysis was performed with a sample of 390 business‐related university students. Amongst the potential contributions made by this study we can highlight the possibility of knowing future managers’ way of thinking and of knowing the aspects where educational centers might improve their CSR teaching. (shrink)

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. This is glaringly revealed by the contrasting recent (...) takes on the issue by writers such as Soames (2005) – who adopts the view by Donnellan (1979) to be outlined presently – and Jeshion (2001), otherwise sharing a similar direct-reference approach to the prototypical expression of those contents. Discussing the matter in connection with the status of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori in the just mentioned article, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent; he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. (Thus, for instance, if, while listening to an utterance in a language that I do not know, I am told by a reliable person who knows the language and whom I trust that the utterance is true, I come thereby to know that the sentence expresses a truth, without knowing the truth that it expresses.) Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. In this paper, I will appeal to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and I will argue that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)

We intuitively make a distinction between _lying_ and _misleading_. On the explanation of this phenomenon favored here—the _adverbial_ account—the distinction tracks whether the content and its truth-committing force are literally conveyed. On an alternative _commitment_ account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it without full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or (...) otherwise implying it. Now, as predicted by the well-supported assumption that we can also assert with pictures, the lying/misleading distinction appears to intuitively show up there too. Here I’ll explain how the debate confronting the two accounts plays out both in general and in that case, aiming to provide support for the adverbial account. (shrink)

Les traités Physique et Métaphysique d’Aristote exposent la thèse de Parménide selon deux approches différentes, voire contradictoires. Je soutiens que Parménide est, dans le premier, présenté en partisan de l’immutabilité, tandis que dans le second il est présenté comme tenant du relativisme. Cette différence répond dialectiquement aux fins de la discussion de chaque traité. Je soutiens que la thèse du monisme, à savoir ‘‘toutes les choses sont une’’, comprise, d’une part, d’un point de vue ontologique et, d’autre part, d’un point (...) de vue épistémologique permet à Aristote de brosser des images assez distinctes de Parménide. (shrink)

Singular terms used in fictions for fictional characters raise well-known philosophical issues, explored in depth in the literature. But philosophers typically assume that names already in use to refer to “moderatesized specimens of dry goods” cause no special problem when occurring in fictions, behaving there as they ordinarily do in straightforward assertions. In this paper I continue a debate with Stacie Friend, arguing against this for the exceptionalist view that names of real entities in fictional discourse don’t work there as (...) they do in simple-sentence assertions, but rather as fictional names do. (shrink)

The paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis’s seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis’s account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are—as Hanley puts it—‘as good as it gets’. Thus elaborated, Lewis’s account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of other classic works of the 1970s by Kripke, van Inwagen (...) and Searle. The turn that Lewis suggests and the paper recommends draws on the remaining outstanding contribution from that time: Walton’s. (shrink)

El trabajo desarrollado en este artículo muestra una experiencia docente basada en la Metodología Activa del Aprendizaje Basado en Proyectos en la asignatura de Instalaciones II de la titulación del Grado en Arquitectura Técnica de la Universidad de Burgos. Para alcanzar la excelencia del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje, se ha diseñado una metodología de trabajo basada en el desarrollo progresivo de un Proyecto de Ejecución mediante subproyectos, con el objetivo de conseguir mejores resultados en el proceso de aprendizaje mediante (...) el desempeño personal, la retroalimentación de procesos y el trabajo cooperativo, todo ello orientado a la excelencia académica y profesional de los estudiantes. Los resultados obtenidos muestran que el ABP es una excelente metodología para el proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje de la asignatura de Instalaciones II y para el futuro desempeño profesional de los estudiantes. (shrink)

Recommending the identity of bidders in public procurement auctions has a significant impact in many areas of public procurement, but it has not yet been studied in depth. A bidders recommender would be a very beneficial tool because a supplier can search appropriate tenders and, vice versa, a public procurement agency can discover automatically unknown companies which are suitable for its tender. This paper develops a pioneering algorithm to recommend potential bidders using a machine learning method, particularly a random forest (...) classifier. The bidders recommender is described theoretically, so it can be implemented or adapted to any particular situation. It has been successfully validated with a case study: an actual Spanish tender dataset which has 102,087 tenders from 2014 to 2020 and a company dataset which has 1,353,213 Spanish companies. Quantitative, graphical, and statistical descriptions of both datasets are presented. The results of the case study were satisfactory: the winning bidding company is within the recommended companies group, from 24% to 38% of the tenders, according to different test conditions and scenarios. (shrink)

Lain (antropölogo, filösofo e historiador de la medicina) define como relaciön amistosa una serie de actividades que en esencia son: desear el bien del amigo por el amigo mismo, igualdad entre los amigos, comunalidad y comunicaciön entre los amigos y consideraciön de una relaciön entre personas. De la misma forma establece que una vez producido el encuentro, para que exista la amistad, deben cumplirse una serie de reglas, tales como el respeto, la liberalidad, la franqueza, la imaginaciön y el discernimiento (...) afectivo. Entre las patologias de la amistad se encuentran: la consideraciön del otro como objeto, alteraciones derivadas de la relaciön (estatus o niveles sociales), alteraciones entre los fines, los grados de amistad y de las propiedades de la relaciön amistosa, y que habitualmente se manifiestan como alteraciones en el respeto, la igualdad, la confidencia y la convivencia. Las alteraciones producidas en la relaciön amistosa pueden superarse si existe respeto, igualdad, franqueza, consideraciön de ambos como personas, liberalidad,... Todos los fenömenos que se han presentado en esta comunicaciön tienen como caracteristicas la alteraciön de alguna de estas reglas de mantenimiento de la amistad. (shrink)